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PAYMENTS TO A CORPORATION OFFICER'S WIDOW
IN INDIANA
As a result of both the modem trend in personnel policy to provide
employees with greater fringe benefits and the fact that wives are sur-
viving their husbands with increasing frequency, corporations are be-
coming more interested in making payments to widows of deceased
corporate officers. Any corporation contemplating the making of such
payments is faced with two immediate problems: (1) Are the payments
intra vires, i.e., within the legitimate power of the corporation? (2) If so,
can the payments be treated as deductible for federal income tax purposes?
In most states, these two broad issues are separable. However, in
Indiana, the presence of an unconstrued and rather unfortunately worded
statute complicates the matter:
The board of directors of every corporation shall have power,
subject to any restrictions contained in the articles of incorpora-
tion, to make contributions out of the gross income of the
corporation to such entities, and for any one or more of such
purposes, as such board may reasonably believe will constitute
such contributions deductions from . . . gross income in com-
puting the net income of the corporation subject to tax, pursuant
to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as amended from
time to time.'
If the statute is construed as governing the making of all contributions,
noncharitable as well as charitable, the problems of corporate power and
deductibility for tax purposes blend, the latter affecting the former be-
cause of the legislature's incorporation of federal tax standards. Since
the legislature has not defined "contributions," the application of this
statute to payments to widows of deceased corporate officers is not clear.
Because of this as yet unresolved ambiguity, both the statutory and non-
statutory theories upon which the payments may be upheld as intra vires
acts are explored. Although the ultimate conclusion is that the payments
are probably supportable under any construction of the statute, no final
choice of the "proper" theory is made; the matter is left to eventual
judicial determination. Deductibility for tax purposes is discussed both
for its intrinsic value and as an incident to one of the possible construc-
tions of the statute.
1. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-211b (Burns 1960).
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PROBLEMS RESULTING FRoM INDIANA'S INCORPORATION OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
All statutes involving an incorporation by reference must face at
least one general problem, that of the validity of legislative incorporation
of a statute enacted in another jurisdiction when the incorporation con-
stitutes an adoption of a law as it is and as it may be modified in the
future.' The most persistent and difficult objection to state statutes
involving incorporation by reference of prospective federal legislation is
that such statutes constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.!
It is contended that if a state statute provides that some unknown future
change in a federal statute will automatically become the law of the in-
corporating state, the legislature, in adopting the prospective measures,
has unconstitutionally abdicated its legislative function.4
On the other hand, some courts have approved incorporation by
reference of prospective legislation. The most frequent ground for up-
holding statutes of this nature is that the federal statute has been made a
standard by which to determine a violation of the state statute.' This
rationale is put forth clearly in State v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc. :'
The ultimate and controlling policy decision-as to whether
there shall be uniformity of federal-state regulation in the field
-rests always with the Legislature and it does not in any vicious
sense abdicate its legislative judgment or authority. [Clearly,
existing law can be adopted; unless prospective law may also be
adopted] the state's policy of uniformity would as a practical
matter be defeated.
The adoption of income tax provisions to determine the extent of cor-
2. Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IOWA L. REV.
705, 707-08 (1953). As pointed out in Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation In-
corporated by Reference, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 89 (1958), there is even some controversy
when the incorporations by reference concern only the law of another jurisdiction as
it existed at the time of the incorporation and not as subsequently ammended. However,
in the latter case the great preponderance of authority supports the validity of the
incorporations. Ibid.
3. United States v. Barnaby, 51 Fed. 20 (9th Cir. 1892); United States v. Paul,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 141 (1832) ; MeCartin, The Constitutionality of the Federal Assimila-
tive Crimes Act, 17 FED. B.J. 157 (1957) ; Note, 70 HA~v. L. REV. 685, 688 (1957).
4. State v. Vino Medical Co., 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl. 588 (1922) ; City of Cleveland
v. Piskura, 45 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
5. Ex parte Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (2d App. Dis. 1934) ; 310
Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Mosher v. Haddock, 46 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct.
1944). For a general discussion of the theories which have been developed 'by the courts
to defend against the objection that incorporation by reference is an unconstitutional
abdiction of a state legislature's functions, see Mermin, Corporate Federalism Again:
State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violations of Existhg and Future Federal
Requirements, 57 YA.LE L.J. 1, 9-14 (1947).
6. 18 NJ. 115, 124-25, 112 A.2d 726, 731-32 (1955).
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porate powers appears to fall within this justification; the Internal Rev-
enue Code and the regulations promulgated under it are used, in effect,
as a standard for deciding what types of contributions are within the
corporate power. As indicated by the court in the Hotel Bar Foods case,
a state legislature which sympathizes with the policies of a particular
federal enactment may legitimately adopt measures designed to have the
state law keep pace with the federal law. Here federal-state uniformity
has been achieved by the legislature's declaration that any expenditure in
the nature of a contribution which is sufficiently rerated to the produc-
tion of corporate income to qualify for deduction in determining federal
income tax liability, is a fortiori authorized by state corporate law.
The legislative purpose behind section 25-211b is important in solv-
ing the problems connected with payments to widows because it not only
must be used as a basis for the defense of the incorporation of federal
law contained in that statute but also will have a bearing on the extent to
which Indiana courts should follow federal interpretations of the assimi-
lated portions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although there is little available legislative history which could be
used as the basis for attributing a legislative purpose to section 25-21 lb,
it is likely that two objectives were foremost: (1) to assist corporations
which are in the planning stage with regard to contributions by establish-
ing a definite standard against which a planned contribution can be meas-
ured in determining whether it is idtra vires and (2) to liberalize state
corporate law. In regard to the second objective, it should be noted that
federal revenue laws are often premised upon collateral policies. For
example, the liberal depreciation rules seek to encourage domestic capital
investment. Thus, it could be argued that deductions for contributions
to charities are provided not only because they are related to a profit
motive in that they increase public goodwill toward the contributing
corporations, but also because they promote the financing of charitable
organizations through diversion of corporate funds. Similarly the legis-
lature may have decided to liberalize state corporate law because it also
recognized that corporate wealth and economic power place philanthropic
and humanistic responsibilities on corporations. In tlis manner, corpora-
tions are given the opportunity to take full advantage of the tax laws, and
the federal policy of encouraging contributions is furthered. This pos-
sible motive is strengthened by the recognition of such a public policy in
judicial decisions which have sanctioned charitable payments by corpora-
tions through an extension of the doctrine of implied powers, allowing a
corporation to engage in any activity that has even a remote relationship
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to the corporation's purpose as set out in its charter.' In either instance,
whether the legislature's purpose was to provide a readily ascertainable
standard or to liberalize the corporate law, the legislature has done all
that is within its power. The fact that uniformity with prospective fed-
eral provisions is highly desirable, if not essential, to carrying out the
legislative policy, accompanied by the discernible trend to uphold legisla-
tive delegations of this nature, indicates that section 25-211b would be
upheld if challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CONTRIBUTION" AS INCORPORATED
Whether a corporate payment to the widow of a deceased employee
is authorized by section 25-211b will be determined in part by the defini-
tion assigned to the term "contributions" by the Internal Revenue Code
and the regulations and decisions construing it and in part by resolution
of the question of the extent to which the state courts are bound to accept
that definition.
While the slight legislative history accompanying passage of 25-21 lb
indicates that its supporters were primarily interested in making charit-
able contributions intra vires,s the statute as enacted did not limit the
term "contributions" to payments of a charitable character.9 The omis-
7. Harum, The Emergeice of the Economic Overdog, 47 A.B.A.J. 286 (1961).
A rationalization for allowing corporations to engage in programs of a charitable nature
is that corporate foundations are much more efficient than the federal government.
This efficiency results from the fact that a corporate foundation can determine when
a genuine need exists and act almost immediately to fill this need, while the government
must operate through the time-consuming device of congressional appropriation.
8. Section 25-211b was not included in the original version of the 1949 ammend-
ments but was included in proposed ammendments to the original Senate Bill. Memor-
andum In Respect of Proposed Ammendments To Senate Bill No. 112 Submitted by
The Indiana Corporation Survey And The Committee on Legislative Programs of The
Indianapolis Bar Association at The Hearing Held By the House Committee on Corpor-
ations on February 15, 1949. Proposed ammendment Number 27 [12b (new section)]:
"Specifically authorizes the board of directors to cause the corporation to make charit-
able contributions for purposes that the 'board may reasonably believe will make them
deductible in computing the corporation's Federal income taxes." There is a marked
similarity between this proposed amnendment and § 25-211b as it was enacted. However
the fact that § 25-211b deleted "charitable" as a modifier of "contributions" indicates
that the legislature had a broader purpose in enacting § 25-211b than those who sup-
ported the proposed ammendment to Senate Bill No. 112.
9. The statute is susceptible of three distinct constructions: (1) On the sole basis
of the plain meaning of the text, the section appears to authorize the making of any
payments which the directors reasonably believe will be deductible under any section of
the Internal Revenue Code. (The directors may make any contributions which they
believe "will constitute such contributions deductions" under the I.R.C.) The defects
of a "plain meaning" construction are obvious: the statute would incorporate an extreme-
ly broad standard of deductibility. No ascertainable or effective meaning could be
ascribed to the term, "contributions." (2) However, a more rational meaning appears
if the plain meaning is supplemented by the consideration of what apparently was the
principal purpose of the original draftsmen. In the original draft of the provision, the
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sion is most significant, for it is clear that, while "contribution" is
frequently used in the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regu-
lations as a synonym for charitable contributions," usage of the term
is not limited to that context." For example the Internal Revenue
Code at section 404 provides for deductions for "contributions" by an
employer to employee pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plans. Further,
section 404(a) (5) allows a deduction "if amounts are paid as a death
benefit to the beneficiaries of an employee (for example, by continuing
his salary for a reasonable period). . . ." In addition, there are numer-
ous cases where courts use "contributions" in referring to non-charitable
corporate payments to various kinds of employee trast funds.' 2 There-
fore, if the Indiana courts follow the construction of the federal courts,
they will consider "contributions" as referring both to charitable dona-
tions and to various other payments deductible as business expenses. This
point has considerable importance for corporations contemplating pay-
ments to the widows of deceased employees since it is clear that the widow
authorization was limited to the making of "charitable contrlbutions." On this con-
struction, the defects of construction No. 1 disappear: The broad standard of deducti-
bility is replaced by a reference to that distinctly separate complex of standards for the
determination of deductions for charitable contributions, and ,:he word "contributions"
acquires an ascertainable meaning. But this construction is not inevitable; if the legisla-
tive intent was to authorize only charitable contributions, then the deletion of "charit-
able" in the final draft is inexplicable. It may have been a mat er of mere inadvertance,
or it may have been purposeful, the legislature intending to broaden the authorization
beyond that contemplated by the original draftsmen. The issue is not capable of
satisfactory resolution. (3) A third possibility exists which tnds to avoid the uncer-
tainties of the first two. The legislature may be taken to ha, e authorized the making
of such payments as would be "deductible as contributions," i.e. those payments which
acquire deduction status by reason of I.R.S. provisions which call them "contributions."
The effect of this construction is to broaden only moderately the apparent original
purpose of the provision by incorporating not only the fede-al law as to charitable
contributions but also those provisions such as § 404 of the I.RLC. which allows deduc-
tion of employer payments to employee trust, annuity, or deferred compensation plans.
For it is clear that the I.R.C. usage of "contributions" is not limited to the context of
charitable payments. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, despite the rational com-
promise reached by this construction, there is no warrant for it on the face of the
statute. If the legislature intended this result, its wording wa.; not well-taken.
10. For example, in Treas. Reg. § 1.170-3 (1956): "Contributions or gifts by
corporations . . . (a) In general. The deduction by a corporation in any taxable year
for charitable contribution as defined in § 170(c), is limited to 5 percent of taxable
income for the year."
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1956), provides that donation to individuals or
corporations other than those referred to as eligible donees for charitable contributions,
and which bear a direct relationship to the business and are made with a reasonable
anticipation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the donation may
constitute allowable deductions as business expenses.
12. Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963) (pay-
ment to profit sharing pension plan); Dejoy Stores Inc., et cI v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 867
(2d Cir. 1956) (contribution to pension trust fund) ; Commissioner v. Surface Combus-
tion Corp., 181 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1950) (contribution to employee trust fund);
Forbes Lithograph Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 F.2d 287 (D. Mass. 1930) (payment to founda-
tion to assist employees).
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is not within that class of donees to whom payments are deductible as
charitable contributions under section 17 0(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code. But the Commissioner is now attempting to have the status of
such payments determined under section 404 which allows a deduction
for "contributions" of an employer to employees' trust, annuity and
deferred contribution plans.
If one assumes that the term "contributions" as used and interpreted
in the code encompasses payments to widows of deceased officers, the
question remains whether Indiana courts will follow such an inter-
pretation. Professor Hart, a well-known authority on the relationship
between state and federal law, has taken the position that the limit of a
state legislature's power seems to be reached when it directs the state
courts to conform as nearly as possible to the federal interpretations."3
If the federal court interpretation of the assimilated federal statute
were binding on the state courts, the assimilated federal language would
have no independent state law significance. Where a federal question
exists, any interpretation of the assimilated federal language by a state
court would be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.'
But several cases substantiate Professor Hart's view that a state cannot
by unilateral appropriation "alter the distribution of federal and state
powers by making federal law directly controlling in a sphere of exclusive
state responsibility."' 5 The absence of a federal question is quite certain
when the incorporated federal law is used to define a term in the state
statute and when the state applies the incorporated federal provisions in
a subject area which was previously controlled only by state law. In
these situations the interpretation which the state court puts upon the
incorporated federal provisions is conclusive; but despite this fact, the
purpose of the state statute may require that state courts voluntarily
follow the federal court's construction of the incorporated federal stat-
ute."8  Section 25-211b is an example of a situation where the state
13. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUlf. L. REv. 489,
536 (1954). Hayes, supra note 2, at 89, 113.
14. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483 (1942), held in
effect that when a decision under state law necessarily involves the construction or
validity of federal law the determination of such federal law gave rise to a federal
question for review by the Supreme Court.
15. Hart, mtpra note 14, at 538. In State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U.S.
511 (1939), the court stated that it had no power of review if the state court was only
incidentally referring to federal court decisions in determining the meaning of a state
statute. This position is in agreement with the position taken by the Supreme Court in
Minnesota v. National Tea, 309 U.S. 551 (1940), in which the court stated that just
because state and federal constitutions contain the same words doesn't make the Supreme
Court's interpretation of these words in the federal constitution binding upon the state
court when it interprets them as they are used in the state constitution.
16. Note, 66 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1498, 1503 (1953).
290
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clearly has the power to make an independent interpretation of the as-
similated federal law, since tax law provisions are being given legal
efficacy in an area of the law where they were not previously operative,
namely the areas of state corporate law which defines the limits of a
corporation's power to make contributions.
However, there appear to be good reasons for Indiana courts not to
exercise their option to ignore federal court interpretations. Although
Indiana courts are not bound to follow the federal court interpretation
of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code incorporated by reference
in section 25-21 lb, the legislative purpose attributed to this statute is still
very important in determining what effect the state courts will give to
federal court interpretation of the assimilated matter. If the purpose of
section 25-211b were merely to provide a definite and easily ascertainable
standard it would appear that the state courts would at least be bound to
refer to the federal court interpretations of the assimilated federal stat-
utes as "persuasive authority" in interpreting the state statute. This
follows because the reason for requiring uniformity of interpretation of
the assimilated statute is to allow corporations to plan their contributions
without any doubts as to whether they are ultra virs. Since the provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code on contributions have been extensively
interpreted in numerous cases, following such interpretations would af-
ford much greater certainty than if the state courts were completely free
to make their own interpretations. Furthermore, since the words of a
statute have little meaning until they are interpreted by the courts, the
incorporated standard would be of little use if the state legislature did not
also intend for the state courts to follow the federal interpretations of the
incorporated provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
If in addition to establishing a definite standard the legislature
wished to liberalize state corporate law by linking it to the Internal Reve-
nue Code's provision on deductible contributions, a 3trong argument can
be made that any payment deductible under the Code, as interpreted by the
federal courts, is intra vires under section 25-211b. This follows because
an interpretation of the assimilated federal statute by the state courts
which restricts the legal meaning of contributions to .1 greater extent than
the federal court interpretation of the term would be in direct conflict
with the purpose of liberalizing corporate law through this incorporation
by reference. Therefore, although Indiana courts are not legally obli-
gated to follow the federal judicial interpretations of the incorporated
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, they shotld voluntarily do so
because such a course of action is in accord with the probable legislative
purpose behind section 25-21 lb.
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INCOME TAX QUESTIONS RESULTING FROM PAYMENTS TO
WIDOWS OF DECEASED OFFICERS
Although "contributions" as used in the Internal Revenue Code and
interpreted by the federal courts does encompass payments to widows of
deceased officers and the Indiana courts should follow these federal court
interpretations of the incorporated provisions of the Code when they
interpret section 25-21 lb, a further step is required by that section before
a board of directors can be sure that payments to widows are intra vires.
Since section 25-211b gives the board of directors power to make con-
tributions if these contributions will constitute deductions from gross
income for tax purposes, it is necessary to determine to what extent payz
ments to widows can be considered deductible under the Internal Revenue
Code. If payments are non-deductible under the Code they may be ultra
vires under section 25-211b. Thus a corporation planning to make pay-
ments to widows of deceased officers is primarily concerned with whether
such payments are "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which establishes no
limitations on such deductions, or whether these payments will fall under
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which impose limita-
tions of one form or another." Despite the considerable amount of
litigation on the deductibility of such payments the issue remains unsettled.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue initially took an extremely
lenient position on this question in a ruling under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939." In essence this ruling stated that payments made to a
widow of a deceased employee, which were designated in a manner con-
sistent with the concept of gifts and which did not exceed the deceased's
yearly salary, could be deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense by the corporation making the payment even if made in the
absence of a contractual obligation; but such payments should not be
includible as income to the widow. The formula for whether a payment
was a gift was whether the recipient had rendered any service for the
allowance paid to her. 9 However, the Commissioner soon became dis-
pleased with the way that corporations were incorporating the literal
language of this ruling into the corporate resolutions authorizing pay-
17. Specifically the question is whether such payments will fall under § 170 dealing
with charitable contributions, under § 101(b) dealing with employee death benefits,
under § 404(a) (5) dealing with contributions to employee trust or annuity plans, or
under § 274(b) which limits gifts deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses to $25 per recipient per year.
18. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 153.
19. Ibid.
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ments to widows. They then deducted such payments as an "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expense, and the widow treated the pay-
ments as a gift to her despite circumstances whicl indicated that the
payments were in return for services rendered by her.2" In the cases
which followed, the courts took the position that in the absence of a
contractual obligation on the part of the corporations the payments were
to be considered gifts and not deductible as business expenses by the
corporation."'
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the Commissioner took
the position2 that the deductibility of such payments as an expense of the
employer should be determined under section 404 which is concerned
with employee's trust, annuity, or deferred compensation plans.2" The
attempt of the Commissioner to have the deductibility of payments to
widows determined under section 404 instead of section 162 is the result
of his theory that such payments should be deductible by the employer
only if they are taxable income to the recipient. The Commissioner ad-
vanced this theory in Commissioner v. Dubersten24 in support of a pro-
posal that the court accept a new definition of gifts for income tax pur-
poses. The definition proposed was "a transfer for personal as distingu-
ished from business reasons." In proposing this new definition the
Commissioner urged that the gift concept is inconsistent with the treat-
ment of the payment as a deductible business expense of the payor.
The Supreme Court in the Dubersteh case rejected the Commission-
er's contention and held that the true criterion to be used to determine
whether a payment was a non-deductible gift for tax purposes is whether
a "detachable, disinterested generosity" was the basic reason for the tax-
payer's conduct. This question was held to be one that should be decided
by the trier of fact. Subsequent cases concerning corporate payments to
20. Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949), where the widow became president of
the corporation and performed minor administrative function3. Payments of $16,000
were held to be gifts under the language of I.T. 3329.
21. Commissioner v. Bear Film Co., 219 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1955); Black v. Davis,
55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9361 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
22. Rev. Rul. 55-212, 1955-1 Cums. BULL. 299. This ruling provides among other
things ". . . if amounts are paid as a death benefit to the beneficiaries of an employee
(for example, by continuing his salary for a reasonable pericd) and if such amounts
meet the requirements of § 162 or 212, such amounts are deductible under § 404(a) (5).
23. However, as stated in Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954-2 Cu%.. BuL.. 85, whether the
payments are treated as business expense under § 162(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code or as compensation under a deferred compensation plan under § 404, the payments
must be for a "limited period" which is construed as referring to the reasonableness
of the total amount rather than the length of the period in which such amounts are to be
paid.
24. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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widows have followed the Supreme Court's position and have held that
no legal obligation on the part of the corporation is necessary to make
such a payment deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
pense so long as the corporation has a compensatory intent.25 Substanti-
ally returning to the view originally taken by the Commissioner under the
1939 Code the Tax Court in a recent case stated that the fact that such
payments actually constitute gifts to the widow did not militate against
their character as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses.26
The cases indicate that the Commissioner's proposal that a payment
be deductible by a corporation as a business expense only if it is taxable
income to the widow has been rejected. However, Congress seemed to
accept the Commissioner's position when it was considering section
274(b), which limits deductions of gifts as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses to twenty-five dollars per recipient per year. This
apparent acceptance is contained in a Senate Committee Report" which
states, in effect, that a payment which was not considered as part of the
recipient's gross income for tax purposes would be considered a gift by
the donor for the purpose of the twenty-five dollar per recipient limit of
gifts as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses deductible by the
donor. Based on this apparent adoption by Congress of the Commis-
sioner's position a strong argument could be made that payments to
widows must be income to them before the payor corporation can deduct
these payments as business expenses.28 While the apparent Congressional
endorsement of the Commissioner's position has yet to be embraced by
the judiciary, Treas. Reg. 1.274-3(b) (1) defines gift as "any item ex-
cludable from the gross income of the recipient under section 102 which
is not excludable from his gross income under any other provision of
Chapter 1 of the Code." The regulation then states that as a result of
the $5,000 exclusion from gross income of the recipient provided by
section 101(b) payments by an employer to a deceased employee's wife
up to $5,000 are not gifts for the purposes of section 274(b). This
implies that payments to the widow in excess of $5,000 will be considered
25. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1080 (1960) ; Champ-
ion Spark Plug Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 295 (1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.
1959).
26. J. Avon & Co. v. Commissioner, 22 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1963).
27. S. R . No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
28. The situation is somewhat different when payments are made to a widow of a
deceased officer who was also a stockholder. In this situation the Commissioner has
taken the position that such payments may constitute constructive dividends which are
non-deductible profit distributions rather than being considered as additional compensa-
tion for the services of the deceased officer and thus deductible as an "ordinary and
necessary" business expense. The factors which are considered in each individual case
before accepting or rejecting the Commissioner's position are discussed in Rubber
Associates Inc. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1964).
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a gift excludable from her gross income by reason of section 102, and a
deduction in computing the income tax liability of the corporation would
not be allowed in excess of twenty-five dollars.
The only policy against the Commissioner's position is that it fails
to take into account the social problems and hardships which may be
imposed upon the widows of deceased employees. The argument would
proceed along the line that the situation of the widow is analogous to
other social problems and hardships such as blindness and old age for
which there are special tax allowances. However, this argument loses
most of its force when the provisions of section 101 (b) are taken into
account since the widow would still be permitted to exclude from income
corporate payments except for the extent to which they exceed $5,000.
In addition, that argument is weak when payments to widows of deceased
officers are concerned since such widows are quite likely to be in an above
average financial position.
If the Commissioner's position that a corporation may take a deduc-
tion as "ordinary and necessary" business expense for payments to a
deceased employee's widow only if this payment is income to the widow
is in fact the law, then a corporation planning to make such payments
must ascertain when such payments will be held to be income to the
widow. In other words, the effect of the Commissioner's position would
be to make the issue of deductibility dependent upon a determination of
the nature of the payment in the hands of the recipient. When con-
fronted with the question of the character of the payment in the hands of
the recipient, courts have frequently commented c n whether the cor-
porate payor has claimed a deduction on the grounds that the payments
were compensation; but this fact has apparently been attributed signifi-
cance only as evidence of the payor's intent.29
After several court decisions held voluntary payments to widows to
be gifts to them rather than taxable income, the Internal Revenue Service
adopted the position"0 that it would not litigate this issue under the 1939
Code unless there was clear evidence that such payments were intended
to be compensation for services. At the same time, the Commissioner
indicated that he would continue to litigate the question under the 1954
Code. The Commissioner's view is that any obligation between employer
and employee, even if it is only a moral obligation or one arising out of
a plan to keep valuable employees happy, rules out a gift and makes the
payment taxable income to the widow.2  This hard-nosed position was
29. See, e.g., Evans v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1964).
30. Rev. Rul. 50-613, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 914.
31. Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Bausch's Estate
v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
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put forth in a 1950 Revenue Ruling"2 which stated:
Irrespective of a plan, voluntary, or involuntary, definite
or indefinite, payments by an employer to the widow of a
deceased officer or employee in consideration of services render-
ed by the officer or employee are not gifts but are includable
in the gross income of the widow, provided such payments
weren't received prior to January 1, 1951.
The Commissioner has also withdrawn his previous position that
Congress, in enacting section 101 (b) which provides for the exclusion
from gross income of the first $5,000 of payments which are received by
reason of the death of an employee, presupposed that all such payments
constitute income." Thus in a case involving a voluntary payment by
the corporation, the dispute is now limited to a question of fact: Does
payment represent payment for past services of the deceased employee
(income), or does it express a donative intent on the employer's part
towards the widow (gift) ? When the courts have been called upon to
make this determination they have reached conflicting results. The
traditional line between taxable compensation and non-taxable gifts was
first drawn in Bogardus v. Commissioner,5 which stated that a payment
is a gift if made "in recognition of, not payment for former services."
The district and circuit courts still follow that general guideline in holding
that whether such payments are gifts depend on the intent of the payor."8
However, the Tax Court has used the decision in Commissioner v. Duber-
stein 7 to hold that payments to widows are not gifts because they do not
arise from a "detached and disinterested generosity.""8
32. I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. BuLL. 9, at 10-11.
33. The Commissioner was unsuccessful in litigation of this question and withdrew
his contentions in Rev. Rul. 62-102. See, e.g., Reed v. U.S., 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D.
Ky. 1959) aff'd sub nora. 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Rice v. U.S., 197 F. Supp. 223
(E.D. Wis. 1961); Cowan v. U.S., 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Frankel v. U.S.,
192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961). Contrary to the Commissioner's contention, the
above cases concluded that the purpose of the 1954 addition of § 101 (b) was to eliminate
the requirement of the corresponding section of the 1939 code, § 22(b) (1) (8), which
granted exclusion in the amounts of $5,000 only where the payment was made pursuant
to contract; the 1954 version thus did not purport to change the existing law that a gift
is excludable in its entirety but merely abrogated the distinction between contractual and
non-obligatory payments.
34. Note, 49 KIY. L.J. 531 (1961).
35. 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
36. Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 1955); Rodner v. United States,
149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
37. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
38. Coopers Estate v. Commissioner, 20 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 774 (1961) ; Fisher
v. Commissioner, 20 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1961); Cronheim v. Commissioner, 20
C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1961). As pointed out in Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 74, 123 (1963)
the tax court has stopped just short of holding that all payments in excess of $5,000
will be considered income to the widow unless she is in bad financial circumstances of
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The law is still unsettled with regard to the tax consequences
of payments by corporations to widows of deceased officers. However,
the Commissioner is taking a logical and consistent position in contending
that a corporation's payment to a widow of a former employee can not
be a business expense to the corporation without being taxable income to
the widow. Taking the contrary position amounts to looking at only
one side of the entire transaction while ignoring the other. It is a
patent absurdity for a court to hold that a payment by a corporation to
the widow of a deceased corporate employee is deductible as a business
expense because it was made with a profit-orientated motive, and then to
declare the payment to be a gift in the hands of the widow because the
basic reason for the payment was a "detached and disinterested generos-
ity" on the part of the corporate payor. The Senate Report may be a good
indication that the Commissioner's viewpoint will be accepted by the
courts in the future. The question as to what is necessary before a
voluntary payment by a corporation to the widow is treated as taxable
income of the widow is a little more uncertain. It seems that the con-
flict between the Tax Court and the district and circuit courts on this
question is reconcilable in that they both recognize t1,at the basic require-
ment to make a payment taxable to the widow is that : t have some definite
relation to the deceased employee's salary or wage and thus manifest a
compensatory intent on the part of the corporation.
A corporation faced with the confusion in the lhw as to the deducti-
bility of payments to widows, and the possibility that such payments will
be held ultra vires under section 25-211b unless deductible under the
Internal Revenue Code, can protect itself by making sure that the pay-
ments have a clear relation to the salary of the deceased employee and
are expressly given in consideration for the services which he rendered
to the corporation during his lifetime. This would probably guarantee
that a court would consider these payments incomet to the widow and
deductible to the corporation even if the Commissioner's position origin-
ally set forth in Duberstein is adopted. Any attempt by a corporation to
make payments which might be found to be gifts to the widow runs the
risk that the deduction claimed by the corporation might be disallowed
under the Internal Revenue Code and thus ultra vir,;s under section 25-
2111b. Such an attempt by a corporation is especially risky in view of the
fact that the Commissioner's position on the deduction-gift question ap-
pears to be gaining acceptance.
which the corporation is aware and unless the amount of the payments are determined
by reference to her financial needs.
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CORPORATE POWER TO MAKE PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF OFFICERS
UNDER THE COMMON LAW
Although payments to widows are deductible under certain circum-
stances, the law in regard to the deductibility of such payments is quite
unsettled. Since the coverage of section 25-211b is tied to deductibility,
a corporation might be rather uncertain as to whether payments to widows
made in the absence of a legal obligation are ultra vires if section 25-211b
is exclusive in so far as determining whether such payments are ultra
ires."9 However, it can be argued that section 25-211b is a permissive
statute, and that no negative inference should arise under it that contribu-
tions which are non-deductible are automatically ultra vires. To allow
such a negative inference would impute a restrictive meaning to a per-
missive statute with a resulting frustration of the legislative purpose.
Consequently, although a payment might not be within section 25-211b,
it still might be intra vires and legal under the general principles of
corporation law.
Because a corporation is given certain legal advantages such as
limited personal liability for its stockholders, the doctrine of ultra ires
has established that a corporation can do only those things for which it
has authorization by its charter or by the general corporate law of the
states in which it is incorporated.4" However, the expressed powers
which are given to the corporation by the charter carry with them the
power to engage in transactions incidental to the business of the corpora-
tion.4' As a result, the essential question in determining whether an act
is ultra vires is whether it has a logical relation to the corporate purpose
as set out in its charter. In each individual case, this question must be
answered by considering the expressed powers and purpose of the par-
ticular corporation and the business situations with which it is faced.42
39. There is a collateral question involved in Indiana as to the effect of the 1949
ammendments to the Indiana General Corporation Act passed in 1929 on corporations
which where given their charters between 1929 and 1949. In Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), it was held a state could not pass a law
which in effect ammended a corporate charter since this would impair a contract and
thus be unconstitutional. The decision suggested that the states reserve the power of
ammendment of corporate charters and this suggestion was followed by virtually all of
the states. However, Indiana did not reserve such a power to amend until 1949. Thus
it could be argued that if § 25-211b allows corporations to make contributions which
were ultra vires under the 1929 General CorporationAct; this results in effect in an
ammendment to the charters of corporations who were incorporated between 1929 and
1949 with a resulting unconstitutional impairment of the contracts represented by these
charters.
40. Cousens, How Tax Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. Rev.
401, 409 (1949).
41. Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 (1891); Green
Bay & Minn. R.R. v. Union Steamboat Co., 107 U.S. 98 (1882).
42. See Jacksonville M.P. Ry. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514 (1880).
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In situations where the above questions are asked with regard to
corporate payments to employees, the courts have recognized that some
donations are justified if they result in the accomplishment of employee
satisfaction. This follows from the fact that a corporation for profit
can not accomplish its objective unless it keeps its employees satisfied by
giving them reasonably considerate treatment."' When any payment is
challenged as ultra vires the courts have insisted that there be a showing
that the expense involved can reasonably be expected to promote the
business interest of the corporation and to result in a distinct and direct
benefit to it.
44
In applying the above standards, courts have found that the granting
of pensions and other payments by corporations to retiring employees are
within the corporation's power because such paymerts would be likely to
have a direct bearing on the successful operation of the business by
(a) helping a corporation to acquire the best employees, (b) raising the
quality of services they would render to the corporation, and (c) increas-
ing the length of their service and loyalty.45
There are few cases directly on point as to whether payments to
widows of deceased officers which are not made in performance of a
pre-existing contract constitute an acceptable corporate action or an ultra
vires one. One such case, Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co.46
involved a board of director's authorization of a payment to the widow
of the long time president of the company. In holding the payment
ultra vires, the court gave the following reasons: (1) the widow had not
performed any services for the corporation; (2) the Pennsylvania statute
did not give corporate directors discretion to make such payments;
(3) the trend of court decisions in allowing corporations to make charit-
able gifts and set up pensions was irrelevant since neither were involved
in this case; (4) allowing such payments would open the door to dissipa-
tion of corporate assets; and (5) the fact that such payments are de-
ductible under the federal tax laws is irrelevant. However, the situation
in the Macaroni case was complicated by circumstances which normally
are not present in cases of payments to the surviving spouses of deceased
officers,"7 and as a result the rule of this case has a rather narrow
43. Cousens, supra note 41, at 406.
44. American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930);
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Sup. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896) ; Appeal
of Poinsett Mills, 1 B.T.A. 6 (1924).
45. Heinz v. National Bank, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1916) ; Henderson v. Bank of
Australia 40 Ch.D. 170 (1888) ; Cyclists Touring Club v. Hopkins, 1 Ch. 179 (1910);
Normandy v. Ind. C. & C., 1 Ch. 84 (1903).
46. 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952).
47. Comment, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 153 (1952), points out these unique circum-
stances. First, the decedent was majority stockholder and the executor of his estate
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application.
Although there is a lack of cases directly on point with which to
rebut the holding of the Macaroni case, the cases concerning pensions and
bonuses for past services can be used to obtain an idea of corporate law
in this general area.4" As is indicated by the rejection of these cases in
the Macaroni case, they fail to support the position taken by that court.
The early cases established the general rule that bonuses or pensions
which amounted to compensation for past services rendered gratuitously
or for a fixed compensation were made in the absence of any legal obliga-
tion on the part of the corporation; and in such circumstances these pay-
ments could not be made over the opposition of any stockholder of the
corporation who challenged them on the grounds that they constituted
udtra vires acts. The later cases have continued to recognize this rule
but have made exceptions to it where the amount of the bonus or pension
is reasonable in view of the services rendered." Recent cases have em-
phasized the requirement that the payments have a reasonable relationship
to the services rendered by the employee."0 Thus it has been held that
payments for past services of a corporation's employees are not ultra vires
where properly awarded, as in connection with a plan for participation in
the corporation's profits or to promote loyalty and efficiency of em-
ployees."' The reasoning of the courts seems to be that payments to
employees who have contributed to the corporation's success are really
not gratuitous in nature despite the absence of legal obligation on the
corporation's part. Such payments have a profit-oriented motive since
they are made with the expectation that they will perpetuate the kind of
performance by employees that is necessary for profitable operations in
the future.
Bonuses for past services which are paid to officers or directors
will be examined more carefully than similar payments to regular em-
ployees because such examination is necessary to protect stockholders
was a member of the board of directors. Second, the main reason for the payment was
to keep decedent's family satisfied while a determination was made as to whether
decedent's son or another more experienced executive would become president.
48. Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branigan, 40 Ind. 361 (1872) ; National Loan
and Investment Co. v. Rockland Co., 36 C.C.A. 370, 94 Fed. 335 (8th Cir. 1889) ; Ellis
v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N.E. 530 (1890) ; Moss v. Copelof, 235 Mass. 162, 126 N.E.
474 (1920) ; Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 Hun. 75, 20 N.Y.S. 788 (1892).
49. Baynum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942), modifying, 41 F. Supp. 355
(D.C. Civ. 1941) ; Wiseman v. Musgrave, 309 Mich. 523, 16 N.W.2d 60 (1944); Wine-
burgh v. Suman Bros., 21 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1940).
50. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1932); Fuch v. National Casting Co., 201 F.
Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Fry v. National Projections Inc., 306 S.W.2d 465 (Mo.
1958) ; Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co., 51 D. & C. 383 (1944), affirmed, 354
Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1945).
51. Spaeth v. Journal Plumbing Co., 139 F. Supp. 188 (1956) ; Neff v. Gas & Elec.
Shop, 232 Ky. 66, 22 S.W.2d 265 (1929).
PAYMENTS TO A WIDOW
from fraud. The basis for this scrutiny is that officers are in a position
to exert undue influence in procuring bonuses which are not justified by
job performance. Similarly, this argument could be used to hold that
payments to widows of deceased officers were not proper because they
have no profit motive and because the widow might exert undue influ-
ence on the corporation, especially if the deceased officer was also a major
stockholder. However, bonuses to officers or directors will not be ultra
vires merely because the recipients are officers." This rule should apply
with equal force to payments to surviving spouses of deceased officers.
Following this general proposition, it was held in In re Woods Estate53
that a resolution by the board of directors providing payment of deceased
officer's salaries to their estates for one year following the officer's
death was intra vires. In the Woods case the court held that the resolu-
tion, adopted ten months prior to the officer's death, was an inducement
to the corporation's officers to continue their employment and that the
decedent's reliance upon this inducement by remaining with the company
created an obligation on the company's behalf.
The cases cited above have established a definite trend toward ex-
pansion of corporate powers to enable corporations to make payments to
their employees in the absence of contractual obligations. This trend is
a result of two factors. First, it is merely another example of the general
decline in the concept of ultra vires as a device to lirait the operations of
a corporation; and second, it reflects the courts' recognition that pay-
ments which are made in the absence of a contractual obligation and
which do not have an immediate beneficial effect on corporate operations
may nevertheless be motivated by profit and be designed to produce a
long range increase in corporate earnings. In view of this trend, a corpor-
ation could make a strong argument that payments to widows of deceased
officers were intra ires if it could show that the payments were reason-
able and had the collateral effect of improving employee satisfaction,
loyalty, and job performance. Corporate payments to widows also might
be thought of as simply another fringe benefit to corporate officers and
therefore obviously within corporate powers. The nmajor obstacle to such
a conception of these payments is their non-contractual nature. However,
the absence of a contractual obligation does not eliminate profit motiva-
tion; and it is the profit motive which makes officer compensation and
fringe benefit plans intra vires.
52. Mann v. Luke, 44 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1943) ; Renn v. Astestos Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d
344 (7th C.C.A. 1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939).
53. 299 Mich. 635, 1 N.W.2d 19 (1941).
